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The Constitutionality of Anti-Drug Paraphernalia
Laws-The Smoke Clears
In recent years, states and communities have realized that their
efforts to curb illicit drug use have been inadequate. Most states and
many communities have chosen to supplement traditional anti-drug
laws with statutes and ordinances aimed at restricting or eliminating
a wellspring and symbol of the drug culture-the "headshop." The
new laws represent an attempt to remove the glaring incongruency
presented by the existence of shops which sell drug paraphernalia in
a society which purports to be waging war on drug abuse.
'This note examines the constitutionality of anti-drug parapher-
nalia laws in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Hoffanan Estates
v. Fliside, Hoffnan Estates.1 Part I analyzes the constitutional battle-
ground on which these laws are challenged; Part II traces the history
of drug paraphernalia laws up to the advent of the Drug Enforce-
ment Administration's Model Drug Paraphernalia Act 2 (MDPA);
Part III discusses the impact the MDPA has had as the prototype of
a "constitutional" drug paraphernalia law; and Parts IV and V focus
on Flipside and the circuit court decisions rendered after it,3 in order
1 455 U.S. 489 (1982), reh denied, 102 S.Ct. 2023 (1982). In Flipside, the Court rejected
a headshop owner's pre-enforcement facial challenge to a village ordinance requiring a busi-
ness to obtain a license to sell any items that were "designed or marketed for use with illegal
cannabis or drugs." 455 U.S. at 491. A pre-enforcement facial challenge is basically an asser-
tion by the plaintiff, prior to any attempt by police to enforce the enactment, that the law is
"'invalid in toto and therefore incapable of any valid application.'" Id. at 494 n.5 (quoting
Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 474 (1974)). The Court in Flipsid noted that when evalu-
ating a facial challenge, a court must consider any limiting construction that a state court or
enforcement agency has proffered. 455 U.S. at 494 n.5 (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford,
408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972)). The plaintiff contended that the ordinance was unconstitutionally
overbroad and vague. The Court employed a two-pronged test in upholding the validity of
the ordinance. The test virtually assures that a carefully drawn anti-drug paraphernalia law
will withstand any pre-enforcement facial challenge to its constitutional validity:
(1) Overbreath-Whether the enactment reaches a substantial amount of consti-
tutionally protected conduct?
(2) Vagueness-Whether the enactment is impermissibly vague in all its
applications?
455 U.S. at 494-95.
2 MODEL DRUG PARAPHERNALIA AcT, Drug Enforcement Administration (1979) [here-
inafter cited as MDPA]. The MDPA is reprinted in Appendix B. The ordinance at issue in
Flipside was not based on the MDPA. That ordinance is reprinted in Appendix A.
3 Thirteen United States Courts of Appeals cases have dealt with challenges to anti-drug
paraphernalia laws since the Flipsid opinion. See note 52 infia.
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to answer the question: are anti-drug paraphernalia laws
constitutional?
I. The Constitutional Battleground
Although plaintiffs have advanced several theories challenging
the constitutionality of drug paraphernalia laws,4 courts have given
serious consideration to only two-vagueness and overbreadth.
Vagueness is a fourteenth amendment due process doctrine. In
Graynedv. City of Rockford,5 the Supreme Court held that in order for a
law to withstand a vagueness challenge, it must (1) provide fair
warning to those whose conduct is subject to the law's prohibitions,
and (2) set out explicit standards for those who apply the law, in
order to avoid arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement. 6 The
Supreme Court has established that a person whose conduct clearly
falls within a statute's prohibitions cannot challenge that statute on
vagueness grounds.
7
Drug paraphernalia laws have also been attacked as unconstitu-
tionally overbroad. Overbreadth is technically a standing doctrine.8
It permits a party in a case involving a first amendment challenge to
4 In addition to fourteenth amendment due process vagueness and first amendment
overbreadth, plaintiffs have argued that drug paraphernalia laws violate the eighth amend-
ment, the right to privacy, the fourth amendment, the takings clause, the commerce clause,
and equal protection. Courts have paid little attention to these arguments. See, e.g., Lady
Ann's Oddities, Inc. v. Macy, 519 F.Supp. 1140 (W.D. Okla. 1981), where the court upheld
the constitutionality of Oklahoma's drug paraphernalia act-a modified version of the
MDPA-against a barrage of constitutional arguments, after severing certain provisions from
the act. Some plaintiffs have even alleged that a state has no legitimate interest to protect in
this area or that the statute used bore no rational relationship to achieving the furtherance of
that interest. These arguments have been summarily rejected. See note 31 inra.
5 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
6 Id. at 108-09. The Grayned Court stated:
First, because we assume that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful
conduct, we insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable
opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague
laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning. Second, if arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit standards
for those who apply them. A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy mat-
ters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective
basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application.
Id Accord Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974); See generally Note, The Void for Vagueness
Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67 (1960); Note, Anti-Drug Paraphernalia Laws:
Voidfor Vagueness?, 61 B.U.L. REv. 453 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Paraphernalia Laws].
7 Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 756 (1974). A vague statute can be cured by subsequent
narrowing of the statute by courts. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
8 Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 508 (White, J., concurring)
(citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612-15 (1973)).
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government restrictions on noncommercial speech to assert that a
law is invalid because it infringes on the.first amendment rights of
others not before the court. 9 - The party asserting the overbreadth
challenge to the statute need not actually be engaged in constitution-
ally protected conduct; it is enough that the statute's very existence
may cause others not before the court to refrain from exercising their
constitutional right to speak or express themselves.' 0 Thus, in an
overbreadth challenge a party may have standing to challenge a stat-
ute if it infringes on another's first amendment rights, despite the fact
that his own rights of free expression are not implicated.1 '
A drug paraphernalia statute that is drafted precisely enough to
avoid vagueness and overbreadth will withstand constitutional scru-
tiny. However, avoiding these two pitfalls has not proven to be an
easy task for lawmakers.
II. Anti-Drug Paraphernalia Statutes-From "Needle Laws" to
the Model Drug Paraphernalia Act
Most states enacted some type of paraphernalia control statute
over a decade ago.' 2 These early statutes were aimed at regulating
the sale and use of hypodermic needles, quinine, and other accesso-
ries of heroin addiction.' 3 By 1976, five states had moved beyond
"needle laws" and had criminalized the possession of a pipe or simi-
lar object that the possessor intended to use to smoke a controlled
substance.' 4 Legislators enacted these "pipe laws" largely because
9 Id.
10 Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973). The rationale behind allowing a
party, whose first amendment rights are not implicated, to challenge a law as unconstitution-
ally overbroad, is that courts want to prevent the "chilling" effect an overbroad statute has or
may have on protected speech. The Broadrick Court stated:
In such cases, it has been the judgment of this Court that the possible harm to
society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by
the possibility that protected speech of others may be muted and perceived griev-
ances left to fester because of the possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.
Id at 612. The Broadrick Court, however, was hardly willing to let the overbreadth doctrine
run too far. The Court noted that facial overbreadth adjudication is an exception to the
traditional rules of practice. Id. at 615. The Court went on to state:
To put the matter another way, particularly where conduct and not merely speech
is involved, we believe that the overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but
substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep. Id.
11 The overbreadth doctrine is truly "manifestly, strong medicine". Overbreadth, like
vagueness, can be cured by subsequent narrowing by courts. Id. at 613.
12 As of 1973, 35 states had enacted heroin paraphernalia laws. See Christianson, Heroin
Paraphernalia: Breakdown of a Fix, 10 CRIM. L. BULL. 493 (1974).
13 Id.
14 These states were Alabama, California, Florida, Indiana, and Mississippi. See Note,
NOTES
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many courts had held that "needle laws" did not prohibit the posses-
sion of non-hypodermic paraphernalia. 15
Although the new "pipe laws" cured many coverage problems,
they encountered a serious constitutional obstacle-vagueness.
Pipes, in and of themselves, have innocent uses, and this characteris-
tic tends to make a pipe less susceptible to regulation than a hypoder-
mic needle.' 6  Moreover, legislators in drafting "pipe laws"
inevitably sought to include the wide variety of objects that the non-
hypodermic drug user may employ. 17 The lawmakers thus sacrificed
precision for effective coverage, thereby enacting pipe laws which
were inherently vague and subject to challenge for failing to meet the
due process requirements of Grayned v. Cit of Rockford. '8
Parapheinalia for Man)'ana andHahish Use: Possession Statutes and Indiana's Pipe Dream, 10 VAL.
L. REv. 353, 354 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Indiana's Pipe Dream].
15 See Kraft v. State, 18 Md. App. 169, 305 A.2d 489 (1973) (Maryland needle law held
not to prohibit the possession of a marijuana pipe); People v. Berger, 61 Misc. 2d 475, 305
N.Y.S.2d 789 (Albany County Ct. 1969) (New York statute prohibiting possession of hypoder-
mic needles, syringes, or "any instrument or implement adapted for the administration of
narcotic drugs," held not to prohibit the possession of ordinary pipes despite the presence of
marijuana residue on the pipe in question); see also Williams v. United States, 304 A.2d 287
(D.C. 1973) (District of Columbia's statute prohibiting possession of any "instrument, tool, or
other implement . . . usually employed . . . in the commission of any crime" held not to
prohibit the possession of a small wooden pipe containing marijuana residue). To eliminate
any doubt that the New York needle law was not meant to prohibit the possession of pipes,
the legislature subsequently amended the statute to limit its application to paraphernalia
accompanying the use of drugs by hypodermic injection. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 3381
(McKinney supp. 1976), as amended, Laws of New York, 1972, ch. 878 § 2, amending Laws
of New York, 1952, Ch. 91 § 1.
16 Although hypodermic needles and syringes also have a variety of lawful uses, ample
allowance for such lawful use can be made by requiring prescriptions or licenses for the pos-
session and use of hypodermic needles because few people actually need hypodermic needles
or syringes for legitimate purposes. On the other hand, a great many people can or do engage
in lawful activities with a pipe. The difficulties of requiring a license or prescription for pipe
possession and use are obvious.
17 California's law was typical; it prohibited the possession of "any device, contrivance,
instrument, or paraphernalia used for unlawftilly injecting or smoking controlled substances."
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11,364 (West 1980). Pipes suitable for smoking controlled
substances come in all shapes and sizes ranging from typical corn cob pipes to elaborate water
pipes or "bongs." In addition, other objects are employed in non-hypodermic drug use, in-
cluding cigarette or "rolling" papers and alligator or "roach" clips. All of these items are (or
arguably may be) inherently innocent. See World Imports, Inc. v. Woodbridge Township,
493 F.Supp. 428, 430 (D.N.J. 1980) (legitimate uses of alligator clips and water pipes); Bambu
Sales, Inc. v. Gibson, 474 F.Supp. 1297, 1299 (D.NJ. 1979) (rolling papers commonly used for
forming tobacco cigarettes).
18 408 U.S. 104 (1972). See notes 5-7 supra and accompanying text. For example, Indi-
ana's law was declared unconstitutionally vague in Indiana Chapter Norml v. Sendak, No.
75-142, slip op. (S.D. Ind. Feb. 4, 1980) (3 judge district court). The Seventh Circuit subse-
quently vacated the case as moot at the time of appeal. 631 F.2d 734 (7th Cir. 1980). The
case was vacated because the Indiana legislature had repealed the first statute and had en-
[April 1983]
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The early anti-drug paraphernalia statutes focused on prohibit-
ing the possession of paraphernalia used with a controlled sub-
stance. 19 Realizing that the paraphernalia industry was big
business,20 states and communities began to shift the focus of para-
phernalia laws to the retailer or manufacturer of the paraphernalia.
21
While these laws varied widely in their form and sanctions, retailers
and manufacturers uniformly objected and proceeded to sue.
The litigation spawned by challenges to early drug parapherna-
lia laws found the courts quick to strike down the vast majority of the
enactments as unconstitutionally vague.22 Headshop owners and
paraphernalia manufacturers attacked the laws as being vague for
failing to provide them with fair warning of what conduct was pro-
acted in its place a law, see note 44 in/a, based on the MDPA. See note 2 supra and notes 33-
44 in/a and accompanying text. The new statute was declared constitutional in its entirety in
Nova Records, Inc. v. Sendak, No. 81-1107 (7th Cir. April 15, 1983).
19 One commentator has called these statutes "possession and use" statutes. Note, The
Constitutionality of Drug Paraphernalia Laws, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 581, 582 (1981). The part of
Florida's statute which outlawed possession of paraphernalia pior to its actual use with con-
trolled substances was declared unconstitutionally vague in Florida Businessmen v. Florida,
499 F.Supp. 346 (N.D. Fla. 1980), afdsub norn, Florida Businessmen v. City of Hollywood,
673 F.2d 1213 (11th Cir. 1982).
20 Estimates on the nationwide sales volume of drug paraphernalia range from $50 mil-
lion to $3 billion a year. U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, COMMUNITY
AND LEGAL RESPONSES TO DRUG PARAPHERNALIA 5 (1980); see also Drug Paraphernalia: Hear-
ings Before the House Select Comm. on Narcotics Abuse and Control, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 87 (1979)
(statement of Peter Bensinger, Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration) (in-
creasing concern that the availability of drug paraphernalia facilitates and glamorizes drug
use).
21 All states listed in note 14supra subsequently amended their laws to outlaw the sale of
paraphernalia as well as its possession. See note 44 in/a. California prohibits the sale of
paraphernalia to minors. Id By 1980 these five states had been joined by several other states
and communities that enacted a variety of anti-drug paraphernalia laws. See notes 22 & 44
in/ra.
22 Magnani v. City of Ames, 493 F.Supp. 1003 (S.D. Iowa 1980); Music Stop, Inc. v. City
of Ferndale, 488 F.Supp. 390 (E.D. Mich. 1980); Knoedler v. Roxbury Township, 485
F.Supp. 990 (D.NJ. 1980); Record Museum v. Lawrence Township, 481 F.Supp. 768 (D.N.J.
1979); Housworth v. Glisson, 485 F.Supp. 29 (N.D. Ga. 1978), afdper curium, 615 F.2d 1295
(5th Cir. 1980); Riddle v. Clack, No. 77-0025, slip op. (N.D. Tex. Aug. 25, 1977). One circuit
court dealt with the question in Geiger v. City of Eagan, 618 F.2d 26 (8th Cir. 1980) and
struck the ordinance down as vague. See also note 18 supra. In Bambu Sales, Inc. v. Gibson,
474 F.Supp. 1297 (D.NJ. 1979) the court found the law in question sufficiently precise to
avoid vagueness but unconstitutionally overbroad as the items proscribed were frequently
used lawfully. The court, however, appeared to confuse vagueness and overbreadth. See 455
U.S. at 497 n.9. (where the Supreme Court, in Flisid, characterized the headshop owner's
argument that the ordinance was overbroad because it could extend to innocent and lawful
uses of the items, as an argument that the ordinance was vague).
. Cases upholding the constitutionality of these early anti-drug paraphernalia laws are
few. See, e.g., Gasser v. Morgan, 498 F.Supp. 1154 (N.D. Ala. 1980); Tobacco Road v. City of
Novi, 490 F.Supp. 537 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
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hibited and for failing to provide explicit standards for police and
courts to follow when enforcing the law. 23 The courts struck down
the statutes and ordinances as unconstitutionally vague because legis-
lators had attempted to define "drug paraphernalia" in objective
terms, to distinguish items that inherently constituted "drug para-
phernalia" from those that did not.24 Considering that most items
that could be termed "drug paraphernalia" have both lawful and
unlawful uses, this task was doomed from the outset.
2 5
An Eighth Circuit case, Geiger v. Cit of Eagan,26 illustrates the
futility of legislative efforts to define "drug paraphernalia" objec-
tively. Eagan, Minnesota, had enacted an ordinance prohibiting the
"possession, sale, transfer or display for sale or transfer" of a "drug
related device."' 27 In holding that the definition of "drug related de-
vice" was not sufficiently clear to meet Grayned's two-pronged test,
the court determined that the common understanding of the words
"any pipe or other object suitable to be used for smoking" was that
they described tobacco smoking accessories and not drug parapher-
nalia.28 Relying solely on the language of the ordinance to deter-
mine what constituted a prohibited "drug related device," the court
found that whether an "object" was suitable to be used for smoking a
23 This is an allegation that the laws failed to meet the two-pronged test set out in
Grayned. 408 U.S. at 108-09. See notes 5-7 supra and accompanying text.
24 Paraphernalia Laws, supra note 6, at 456.
25 See note 17 supra.
26 618 F.2d 26 (8th Cir. 1980).
27 Id. at 27.
28 Id. at 29. The precise issue facing the court was whether the definition of "drug re-
lated device" was sufficiently clear to meet the two-pronged requirements of Grayned. 408
U.S. at 108-09. See notes 5-7 supra and accompanying text. The ordinance in Geiger defined
"drug related device" as "any pipe or other object suitable to be used for smoking" with one
of the following characteristics:
1. Contains a visible fine wire mesh screen or;
2. Contains a bowl with the interior surface made of metal, glass, acrylic, plex-
iglass or plastic; or
3. Contains a bowl with an inside diameter of one-half inch or less at the halfway
point between the top and the bottom of the bowl; or
4. Contains a chamber; or
5. Contains a flexible tube or tubes.
"Chamber", "bowl", and "pipe stem" are further defined in the ordinance:
"Chamber" means an enclosed area suitable for the collection or movement of
smoke, other than a bowl, pipe stem, flexible tube, or a tube suitable for holding
cigarettes or cigars.
"Bowl" means a concave-shaped object suitable for holding a smoking mate-
rial to be lighted.
"Pipe stem" means a non-flexible tube with one end entering directly into a
bowl.
618 F.2d at 28-29.
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controlled substance depended primarily upon the ingenuity and
practices of drug users. 29 The court further stated that the character-
istics enumerated in the ordinance, intended to aid in determining
what constituted a drug related device, were themselves vague.
30
Although the ordinance in Gezger was void for vagueness, the
Geiger court entertained no doubt that Eagan "clearly" had the
power to enact a properly drawn drug paraphernalia law. 31 As an
29 618 F.2d at 29.
30 Id. As such, the ordinance failed to meet the first prong of the Grayned test because it
failed to give fair warning. See notes 5-7 supra and accompanying text. The Geiger court went
on to hold that the ordinance failed the second prong of the test as well, because it did not
establish explicit standards for enforcement. 618 F.2d at 29. See notes 5-7supra and accompa-
nying text. The court in Geiger was concerned that an arrest for a violation of the parapher-
nalia ordinance would be used to justify a search incident to the arrest that would in turn be
directed at finding the controlled substance itself. This is undeniably a problem, for the rea-
sonable policeman no doubt knows or believes that where there is paraphernalia, the illegal
substance is likely close at hand. Where there is smoke (paraphernalia), there is fire (dope).
For interesting commentary on the fourth amendment implications of paraphernalia laws see
Indiana's Pipe Dream, supra note 14, at 367-73. Subsequent to the Geiger decision, however,
courts-when dealing with legislation based on the MDPA-have refused to give fourth
amendment attacks on paraphernalia laws much consideration. See, e.g., Mid-Atlantic Acces-
sories Trade Ass'n v. Maryland, 500 F.Supp. 834 (D. Md. 1980). There, the court dismissed
the plaintiff's contention that Maryland's drug paraphernalia law violated the fourth amend-
ment's prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures as lacking in merit. The plaintiffs
argued that possession of an item that might arguably be drug paraphernalia was not enough
to constitute probable cause for a drug search. The plaintiff's point was that by making
possession of drug paraphernalia a crime, Maryland's statute permitted arrest for the posses-
sion of paraphernalia and a search incident to that arrest aimed at seizing drugs. The law,
according to the plaintiffs, authorized searches not based on probable cause. The court made
it quite clear that it was not persuaded by this argument. It determined that if a state may
validly make possession of drug paraphernalia a crime, the fourth amendment permits a
search incident to that arrest. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973). As the
district court found the law in question constitutional, plaintiff's fourth amendment argu-
ment failed.
31 618 F.2d at 28. The Geiger court is not alone in this finding. Every court that has been
called upon to determine the constitutionality of a drug paraphernalia law has recognized
that states and communities have the power to regulate or ban drug paraphernalia. A state
need only show that a law bears a rational relation to a legitimate state interest and that the
legislation is a reasonable means of achieving a legitimate state goal. Exxon Corp. v. Gover-
nor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978). A state has a legitimate interest in curbing drug abuse.
While it may be less clear that regulating or banning drug paraphernalia bears a rational
relationship to curbing drug abuse, most courts have so held. As the Fifth Circuit recently
stated:
One need not squint in the dark to perceive a link between the illegal use of drugs,
particularly by youngsters, and items used to facilitate drug use. The Louisiana
legislature is within its constitutional authority when it addresses in this manner,
the problems involved in drug abuse. Whether the measure is wise, prudent or
likely to succeed is a decision for the legislature. The courtroom is not the forum for
that debate.
Tobacco Accessories v. Treen, 681 F.2d 378, 386 (5th Cir. 1982) (upholding Louisiana's drug
paraphernalia act, an act modeled. on the MDPA, see note 2 supra and notes 33-44 infla and
NOTES
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example of such a law, the court referred to the recently drafted
Model Drug Paraphernalia Act (MDPA).
32
III. The Model Drug Paraphernalia Act-The Prototype of a
Constitutional Drug Paraphernalia Law?
A. The Statuloy Scheme
In August, 1979, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
of the Justice Department drafted the Model Drug Paraphernalia
Act (MDPA). The DEA designed the MDPA as an amendment to
the Uniform Controlled Substances Act 33 in response to the setbacks
earlier paraphernalia laws had suffered at the hands of the courts.
34
The MDPA is the DEA's attempt to write a statute broad enough to
deal with the problem of drug paraphernalia, narrow enough to
avoid impinging on constitutionally protected conduct, and precise
enough to be understood by both the law's enforcers and its targets. 35
The statutory scheme of the MDPA is straightforward. There
are four articles. Article I defines "drug paraphernalia" and lists cer-
tain items that are to be considered drug paraphernalia.3 6 Article I
also lists certain factors that a court or other authority should con-
sider to determine whether an object is drug paraphernalia. 37 The
list of factors is not meant to be mandatory or exhaustive, but rather
the factors should be considered in addition to other logically rele-
vant factors. 38 Article II, the offenses and penalties section, is divided
into four parts. The parts respectively criminalize the possession, the
accompanying text). In any event, it is well established that a state has only a modest burden
when it attempts to meet the rational relationship test. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348
U.S. 483 (1955). Any doubt that a state or community has the power to regulate or ban drug
paraphernalia was erased by the Supreme Court in Flipside. The Court stated: "Many
American communities have recently enacted laws regulating or prohibiting the sale of drug
paraphernalia. Whether these laws are wise or effective is not, of course, the province of this
court." 455 U.S. at 504-05.
32 618 F.2d at 28 n.4.
33 The Uniform Controlled Substances Act has been adopted by 46 states. UNIF. CON-
TROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT 9 U.L.A. 78 (Supp. 1983) (table of adopting jurisdictions).
34 For a history of the MDPA see Note, The Model Drug Paraphernalia Act: Can We Outlaw
Head Shops-.-And Should We? 16 GA. L. REv. 137 (1981). An excellent analysis of the MDPA
and a review of the DEA's comments to the MDPA is contained in Paraphernalia Laws, supra
note 6, at 463-76. See also MDPA comments at 6-8 where the DEA asserts that the MDPA
should withstand attacks on grounds of vagueness.
35 See Levas & Levas v. Village of Antioch, Ill., 684 F.2d 446, 449 (7th Cir. 1982).
36 MDPA Art. I. The MDPA defines drug paraphernalia as "all equipment, products
and materials of any kind which are used, intended for use, or designed for use, in. . . intro-





manufacture or delivery, the delivery to a minor, and the advertise-
ment of drug paraphernalia.3 9 Article III provides for civil seizure
and forfeiture of drug paraphernalia. 40 Article IV permits severabil-
ity in the event some provision or provisions of the Act are found
unconstitutional.
41
Two features distinguish the MDPA from earlier anti-drug par-
aphernalia statutes. First, the Act attempts to give a precise defini-
tion of drug paraphernalia by listing examples and factors for a court
or other authority to consider when determining whether a given ob-
ject is drug paraphernalia. 42 Second, and more importantly, the
MDPA contains an intent requirement to mitigate any definitional
ambiguity or uncertainty. 43 The MDPA has now been adopted in its
39 MDPA Art. II.
40 MDPA Art. III.
41 MDPA Art. IV.
42 See Levas & Levas v. Village of Antioch, Ill. 684 F.2d 446, 449. See also MDPA com-
ments at 6-7.
43 Id. The MDPA is designed to satisfy the two-pronged Grayned test. See notes 5-7 supra
and accompanying text. The MDPA attempts to give fair warning to those whose conduct is
subject to its prohibitions by combining a precise definition of drug paraphernalia with a
specific intent requirement. The MDPA incorporates the specific intent requirement in two
places. First, in MDPA Art. I, drug paraphernalia is defined as "equipment, products [or]
materials of any kind which are used, intended for use, or designed for use, . . . [with] a
controlled substance." Second, in Article II the substantive offenses are also defined in terms
of specific intent. The acts prohibited are 1) "us[ing], or. . . possess[ing] with intent to use,
drug paraphernalia . . . [with] a controlled substance." 2) "deliver[ing], possess[ing] with
intent to deliver, or manufactur[ing] with intent to deliver, any drug paraphernalia, knowing
or under circumstances where one reasonably should know, that it will be used. .. [with] a
controlled substance." 3) "plac[ing]. . . [an] advertisement, knowing or under circumstances
where one reasonably should know, that the purpose of the advertisement, in whole or in
part, is to promote the sale of objects designed or intended for use as drug paraphernalia."
To have a violation of the MDPA two actions done with specific intent are needed.
Without the first, nothing is drug paraphernalia. Without the second, no act committed by a
person and involving drug paraphernalia is prohibited. See Mid-Atlantic Accessories Trade
Ass'n v. Maryland, 500 F.Supp. 834, 844 (D. Md. 1980). In other words, to violate the
MDPA, one must have paraphernalia and do something with it.
In Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945) the Supreme Court recognized that re-
quiring specific intent as an element of a criminal offense can cure an otherwise vague statute.
See also Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337 (1952). This principle, though
well established, has not gone without criticism. See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, HANDBOOK ON
CRIMINAL LAW § 11, 86-87 (1972). LaFave and Scott note that a scienter requirement is not
a guarantee that an accused has any notice of the law, but only conditions punishment on a
finding that had the accused been aware of the statutory prohibition he would have known
his conduct was illegal. According to LaFave and Scott, because it is the knowledge of the
consequences of one's actions and not the knowledge of the existence or meaning of the law
which is relevant, uncertain language in a statute is not clarified by a scienter requirement.
The MDPA also attempts to satisfy the second prong of the Grayned test, see notes 5-7
supra and accompanying text, by providing standards for judges and police to follow so that
the danger of arbitrary enforcement is minimal. The Act does this by listing certain factors
NOTES
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entirety or in a modified version by a majority of the states and by
many communities. 44 Although some of its provisions have been sub-
that a court or other authority should consider in determining whether a given object is drug
paraphernalia. MDPA Art. I.
While the scienter requirement is the heart of the MDPA, the DEA made two other
arguments to support the statute's scheme in its comments. First, a legislature can employ
broad terms when the subject of the statute does not lend itself to precise definition. The
DEA asserted that it is far better to regulate drug paraphernalia imprecisely than to fail to
regulate it at all. See United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1 (1947). Second, some of the terms
used in the statute, while imprecise at one time, have been rendered more specific by trade
usage. See Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266 U.S. 497 (1925). See generally MDPA
comments 6-8.
44 In Stoianoff v. State of Montana, 695 F.2d 1214, (9th Cir. 1983), the court noted that
twenty-five states had adopted MDPA-based legislation. They are:
Arkansas: ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 82-2601(Y), 82-2644 to 82-2650 (Supp. 1981); Colo-
rado: COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 12-22-501 to 12-22-506 (Supp. 1982); Connecticut:
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 19-443(20)(A), 19-472(A), 19-474(A), 19-474(B)(West
Supp. 1982); Delaware: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 4701(13), 4771 to 4775 (Supp.
1982); Florida: FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 893.12, 893.145 to 893.147 (West Supp. 1983);
Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-13-32 to 16-13-32.2, 16-13-49 (1982); Idaho:
IDAHO CODE §§ 37-2701(BB), 37-2734A, 37-2734B, 37-2744(A)(7) (Supp. 1982);
Kansas: KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-4150 to 65-4157 (Supp. 1982); Louisiana: LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1031 to 40:1036 (West Supp. 1983); Maine: ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1111-A (1983); Maryland: MD. ANN. CODE, art. 27,
§§ 287A, 297 (1982); Massachusetts: MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 94C, §§ 1, 321, 47(A)(6)
(Michie Law Co-op Supp. 1982); Montana: MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-10-101 to
45-10-107 (1981); Nebraska: NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-439 to 28-444, 28-431 (Supp.
1982); Nevada: 1981 NEv. STATS. 216; New Hampshire: N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 318-B:I(X-A), 318-B:2, 318-B:26 (Supp. 1981); New Jersey: N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 24.21-46 to 24.21-53 (West Supp. 1982-83); New Mexico: N.M. STAT. ANN.
§§ 30-31-2(W), 30-31-25.1, 30-31-34 (Supp. 1982); North Dakota: N.D. CENT.
CODE §§ 12.1-31.1-01 to 12.1-31.1-06 (Supp. 1981): Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 63, §§ 2-101(32), 2-101.1, 2-405, 2-503 (West Supp. 1982-83); Pennsylvania:
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 780-102(B), 780-113(A)(32-34), 780-113(I), 780-128
(A)(1) (Purdon Supp. 1982-83); Texas: TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4476-15,
§§ 1.02(29), 4.07, 5.03(7), 5.15 (Vernon Supp. 1982-83); Utah: UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 58-37A-1 to 58-37A-6 (Supp. 1981); Virginia: VA. CODE §§ 18.2-265.1 to 18.2-
265.4 (1982); Washington: WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 69.50.102, 69.50.412,
69.50.505 (Supp. 1982).
Id. at 1217 n.3.
Eighteen other states have adopted paraphernalia legislation. Some of the statutes are
based on the MDPA, others take various approaches ranging from licensing requirements to
prohibiting the sale of smoking accessories to minors:
Alabama: ALA. CODE § 20-2-75 (Supp. 1982); Arizona: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-3411 (Supp. 1982-83); California: CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 11364.5,
11472 (West Supp. 1982); Illinois: ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, §§ 2358-1 to 2358-5
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982-83); Indiana: IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-48-4-8.1 to 35-
48-4-8.3, 16-6-8-5.1 (Burns Supp. 1982); Kentucky: KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 218A.500, 218A.510, 218A.990(14) (Baldwin 1982); Minnesota: MINN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 152.01(18), 152.092 to 152.095, 152.19 (West Supp. 1983); Mississippi:
MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-29-105(v), 41-29-139, 41-29-153, 41-29-154, 41-29-177, 41-
29-179, 41-29-181 (Supp. 1983); Missouri: Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 195.010(11),
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jected to constitutional attack, recent trends indicate that it will sur-
vive to become the prototype of a constitutionally sound drug
paraphernalia law.
B. Five Problem Areas in the MDPA
The MDPA has been subjected to a wide variety of constitu-
tional attacks;45 however, vagueness and overbreadth represent the
most serious challenges to the Act's validity. Five specific areas have
drawn the brunt of the attacks: (1) the language "intended for use,
or designed for use" used in article I to define drug paraphernalia;
(2) the list of items in article I that are to be included as drug para-
phernalia; (3) the factors listed in article I that a court or other au-
thority should consider when determining whether an object is drug
paraphernalia; (4) the language "under circumstances where one rea-
sonably should know"-the constructive knowledge standard-that
is used in articles I and II; and (5) article II's prohibition on placing
an advertisement to promote in whole or in part the sale of drug
paraphernalia.
The first four areas have been attacked as vague while the fifth
has been attacked as overbroad. Prior to the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in F'bside, numerous district and circuit courts ruled on the con-
stitutionality of statutes and ordinances based on the MDPA. The
courts focused on these five areas and reached mixed results. Some
upheld the legislation in its entirety, 46 others struck it down, 47 still
195.020, 195.135, 195.140, 195.200 (Vernon Supp. 1983); New York: N.Y. GEN.
Bus. LAW §§ 850 to 853 (McKinney Supp. 1982-83); North Carolina: N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 90-113.20 to 90-113.24 (Supp. 1981); Ohio: OHIO REv. CODE ANN.
§ 2925.14 (Page 1982); Oregon: ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 163.575, 163.580 (1981);
Rhode Island: R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 21-28.5-1 to 21-28.5-4 (Supp. 1982); South Caro-
lina: S.C. CODE §§ 44-53-110, 44-53-391 (Supp. 1982); Tennessee: TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 39-4-411 to 39-4-418 (1982); West Virginia: W. VA. CODE §§ 47-19-1 to
47-19-8 (Supp. 1982); Wyoming- Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 35-7-1002, 35-7-1049, 35-7-
1056, 35-7-1057 (Supp. 1982).
The remaining seven states and the District of Columbia have no laws specifically aimed
at prohibiting drug paraphernalia. Several municipalities and counties do have such laws.
45 See note 4 supra.
46 Casbah, Inc. v. Thone, 651 F.2d 551 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1005 (1982),
reh g denied, 102 S. Ct. 2023 (1982) (upholding the constitutionality of Nebraska's drug para-
phernalia act); Virginia Tobacco Accessories Trade Ass'n v. Commonwealth, Nos. 81-0610-A,
81-061 I-A, 81-0632-A slip op. (E.D. Va. July 22, 1981) (mem.) (upholding constitutionality of
Virginia's drug paraphernalia law); Atkins v. Clements, 529 F. Supp. 735 (N.D. Tex. 1981)
(upholding the constitutionality of Texas's drug paraphernalia act.); Nova Records, Inc. v.
Sendak, 504 F.Supp. 938 (S.D. Ind. 1980) (upholding the constitutionality of Indiana's drug
paraphernalia act); Mid-Atlantic Accessories Trade Ass'n v. Maryland, 500 F.Supp. 834
(D.Md. 1980) (upholding the constitutionality of Maryland's drug paraphernalia act); Dela-
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others upheld laws after severing objectionable provisions.48 The
various conclusions led one commentator to lament that the failure
of a suitable case to reach the Supreme Court had postponed a reso-
lution to the conflict.
49
IV. The Fh'bside Decision-the "Suitable" Case?
Although Flipside's "suitability" to resolve the conflicts in this
area is debatable,50 the Supreme Court used the case as a vehicle for
ware Accessories Trade Ass'n v. Gebelein, 497 F.Supp. 289 (D. Del. 1980) (upholding the
constitutionality of Delaware's drug paraphernalia act); World Imports, Inc. v. Woodbridge
Township, 493 F.Supp. 428 (D.N.J. 1980). See Brache v. County of Westchester, 658 F.2d 47
(2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1005 (1982). The Brache decision represents the best
judicial treatment accorded the difficult standing issues involved in pre-enforcement chal-
lenges to drug paraphernalia laws. The court held that plaintiff-headshop owners, having lost
their challenge to Westchester County's drug paraphernalia ordinance as applied to their sale
of single use items, had no standing to secure a broader ruling concerning multi-use items,
especially since their claims involved no first amendment concerns that might trigger an over-
breadth challenge. Noting that United States v. Raines teaches that a party to whom a statute
may constitutionally be applied lacks standing to challenge the statute on the ground that it
would be unconstitutional as applied to "other persons" or "other situations", 658 F.2d at 52
n.7 (citing United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960)), the Second Circuit determined
that since the plaintiffs admitted that at least some of the items they were selling ("free-base
cocaine kits," "marijuana test kits," "coke kits") could only be used in ways clearly violative
of the ordinance, the plaintiffs could not attack the ordinance as it might be applied to other
items which could be used in other ways. In many ways, the Brache decision foreshadowed
the Supreme Court's decision in Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. 489
(1982).
47 Record Revolution No. 6, Inc. v. City of Parma, 638 F.2d 916 (6th Cir. 1980), vacated
and remanded, 451 U.S. 1013 (1981), vacated and remanded, 102 S.Ct. 2227 (1982) (striking down
Parma, Ohio's Drug Paraphernalia Ordinance. The Record Revolution opinion has twice been
vacated by the Supreme Court, once because of a change in Ohio law, and recently to be
reconsidered in light of Fpside); Information Management Servs., Inc. v. Borough of Pleas-
ant Hills, 512 F.Supp. 1066 (W.D. Pa. 1981); Franza v. Carey, 518 F.Supp. 324 (S.D.N.Y.
1981) (striking down New York State's drug paraphernalia law); Back Door Records v. City
of Jacksonville, 515 F.Supp. 857 (E.D. Ark. 1981).
48 Lady Ann's Oddities, Inc. v. Macy, 519 F.Supp. 1140 (W.D. Okla. 1981) (upholding
Oklahoma's drug paraphernalia act after severing objectionable provisions); New England
Accessories Trade Ass'n v. Browne, 502 F. Supp. 1245, (D. Conn. 1980), vacated and remanded,
679 F.2d 873 (1981) (upholding Connecticut's drug paraphernalia law after severing the por-
tion relating to possession of drug-related objects). See also Hejira Corp. v. MacFarlane, 660
F.2d 1356 (10th Cir. 1981) (Colorado's drug paraphernalia act, not directly based on the
MDPA, was upheld after excising objectionable provisions).
49 Note, The Model Drug Paraphernalia Act: Can We Outlaw Headshops-And Should We? 16
GA. L. REV. 137, 139 (1981).
50 Hoffman Estates' ordinance was not based on the MDPA. See Appendix A infra. The
thrust of the ordinance was to require a business to obtain a license before it could sell items
"designed or marketed for use with illegal cannabis or drugs." The ordinance required the
business to file affidavits that the licensee and its employees had not been convicted of a
drug-related offense. The ordinance made it unlawful to sell or give such items to minors.
Moreover, the ordinance required the licensee to keep a record of the items sold, and this
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setting forth the proper analysis to be applied by lower courts con-
fronted with a pre-enforcement facial challenge to the constitutional-
ity of a drug paraphernalia law.5' The Supreme Court's analysis
virtually assures that an anti-drug paraphernalia law will withstand
a pre-enforcement facial challenge to its constitutionality. Fh'oside
has had a pronounced effect on the circuits - in the thirteen cases
dealing with drug paraphernalia laws decided subsequent to Flipside,
only one held an ordinance unconstitutional.
52
record had to contain the name and address of the purchaser. This record was to be open to
police inspection. The penalty for violating the ordinance was a civil fine, but the ordinance
was "civil" only in form. See note 72 infra.
51 See note I supra.
52 Record Head Corp. v. Sachen, 682 F.2d 672 (7th Cir. 1982). The Seventh Circuit held
a West Allis, Wisconsin drug paraphernalia ordinance-not patterned after the MDPA-
unconstitutionally vague. The ordinance was a criminal law banning sales, offers to sell,
dispensing, gifts and displays of drug-related "instruments." The ordinance absolutely
banned the above activities anywhere within 1,000 feet of a school; otherwise drug parapher-
nalia could be sold only in parts of premises not open to minors or to which minors were not
allowed unless accompanied by a parent or guardian. The court held that several imprecise
factors, enumerated by the ordinance to be considered in deciding what is an "instrument,"
exacerbated the ordinance's vagueness and resulted in a serious risk of arbitrary enforcement.
In twelve other cases, courts of appeals have upheld the constitutionality of a variety of
drug paraphernalia laws. Nova Records, Inc. v. Sendak, No. 81-1107 (7th Cir. April 15,
1983) (upholding Indiana's drug paraphernalia statute, which differed slightly from the
MDPA); Camille Corp. v. Phares, No. 82-1410 (7th Cir. April 13, 1983) (upholding East
Moline, Illinois' drug paraphernalia ordinance, which was based on the MDPA but did not
contain a severability clause); Stoianoff v. State of Montana, 695 F.2d 1214 (9th Cir. 1983)
(upholding Montana's drug paraphernalia act, which was patterned after the MDPA); Levas
& Levas v. Village of Antioch, Ill., 684 F.2d 446 (7th Cir. 1982) (upholding Antioch's drug
paraphernalia ordinance, which was based on the MDPA); General Stores, Inc. v. Bingaman,
695 F.2d 502 (10th Cir. 1982) (upholding New Mexico's drug paraphernalia act, which was
patterned after the MDPA); Weiler v. Carpenter, 695 F.2d 1348 (10th Cir. 1982) (upholding
Clovis, New Mexico's drug paraphernalia ordinance-which was based on the MDPA-but
only after severing the portion of the ordinance providing for the forfeiture of paraphernalia
without a hearing); Kansas Retail Trade Co-Op v. Stephan, 695 F.2d 1343 (10th Cir. 1982)
(upholding Kansas' drug paraphernalia act which was nearly identical to the MDPA); New
England Accessories Trade Ass'n v. City of Nashua, 679 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1982) (upholding
New Hampshire's drug paraphernalia statute and Nashua, New Hampshire's drug parapher-
nalia ordinance. Both the statute and the ordinance were closely patterned after the MDPA);
Florida Businessmen v. City of Hollywood, 673 F.2d 1213 (1 1th Cir. 1982) (upholding Flor-
ida's state "head shop" law and Hollywood, Florida's drug paraphernalia ordinance. Both
the state law and ordinance were modeled after the MDPA. The circuit court did, however,
affirm the district court's severance of the portion of the statute that prohibited the mere
possession of drug paraphernalia as unconstitutionally vague. Florida's law excluded the
"with intent to use" language of the MDPA; thus, the words needed to create the scienter
requirement were omitted. As such, Florida's ban on mere possession of paraphernalia was
unconstitutional); High O1' Times, Inc. v. Busbee, 673 F.2d 1225 (1 lth Cir. 1982) (upholding
Georgia's 1978 and 1980 "head shop" laws, which were not patterned after the MDPA); New
England Accessories Trade Ass'n v. Tierney, 691 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1982) (upholding the con-
stitutionality of Maine's drug paraphernalia act-which was patterned after the MDPA);
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A. The Background
The Fh'bside opinion illustrates the old truism about prisms-
where one goes in determines where one comes out. That is, the
analysis applied to the statute determines whether it will pass consti-
tutional muster. Flipside had done business (selling records, smoking
accessories etc.) for about three years prior to May 1, 1978, the date
that Hoffman Estates' drug paraphernalia ordinance was to become
effective.53 After an administrative inquiry, the village determined
that Flipside and another shop appeared to be violating the ordi-
nance.54 The village attorney notified Flipside of the violation and
made available to Flipside copies of the ordinance and a series of
licensing guidelines. 5
5
Flipside's owner asked the village attorney's advice concerning
what items the store could not sell if it failed to obtain a license, and
thereafter removed the objectionable items. 56 Flipside's owners de-
cided not to comply with the licensing requirements and proceeded
to sue the village alleging that the ordinance was unconstitutionally
vague and overbroad.57 Flipside asked for injunctive and declaratory
relief and for damages.58 The district court upheld the constitution-
ality of the ordinance; however, the Seventh Circuit reversed, finding
the ordinance unconstitutionally vague on its face.59
Tobacco Accessories v. Treen, 681 F.2d 378 (5th Cir. 1982) (upholding Louisiana's MDPA-
based drug paraphernalia act).
Subsequent to the Flipside decision the Supreme Court denied certiorari in two cases that
expressly held MDPA-based statutes constitutional in their entirety. Casbah, Inc. v. Thone,
651 F.2d 551 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1005 (1982), reh g denied, 102 S.Ct. 2023,
(1982); Florida Businessmen for Free Enterprise v. City of Homestead, Fla., 679 F.2d 252
(11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 763 (1983) (affirming without opinion the district
court's summary judgement upholding the constitutionality of the city's MDPA-based ordi-
nance). The Court's denial of certiorari in these two cases may give some indication that the
Court would rule against a pre-enforcement facial challenge to a statute or ordinance pat-
terned after the MDPA. This is especially true in light of Flipside, 455 U.S. 489 (1982).
53 455 U.S. at 491-92.





59 Flipside, Hoffman Estates v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 639 F.2d 373 (7th Cir. 1981).
The Seventh Circuit, in holding the ordinance void for vagueness, felt that neither prong of
the Grayned test had been satisfied. See notes 5-7 supra and accompanying text. First, there
was no fair warning because "drug paraphernalia" was not defined in the ordinance. The
court reasoned this would require a store owner to obtain a license if he displayed almost any
item in the proximity of "literature encouraging illegal use of. . .drugs." Even displaying a
paperclip might require a storeowner to obtain a license! Id. at 382-83. Second, the court
noted that there was a "genuine danger that enforcement of [the] ordinance [would] be used
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B. The Supreme Courts Analwsis
1. Overbreadth
6°
The Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit, stating that
"under a proper analysis. . . the ordinance [was] not facially inva-
lid."' 61 The Supreme Court's "proper" analysis consisted of a two-
phase inquiry: (1) overbreadth and (2) vagueness.62 The Supreme
Court held that a statute would be unconstitutionally overbroad only
if the enactment reached a substantial amount of constitutionally
protected conduct.63 Constitutionally protected conduct in the con-
text of an overbreadth challenge entailed the first amendment rights
of Flipside or other parties.
64
Flipside argued that (1) the ordinance imposed a prior restraint
on speech,65 and (2) the ordinance infringed on protected symbolic
speech. 66 The Court quickly disposed of these contentions by finding
that the ordinance only implicated commercial speech that proposed
an illegal transaction; therefore, a government could regulate or ban
the speech entirely. 67 The Court further held that any possible effect
to harass individuals choosing [different] lifestyles." The court felt that this danger of dis-
criminatory enforcement stemmed from the subjective nature of the design and marketing
tests. Id. at 384. The court went on to state that the availability of administrative review or
of guidelines could not cure the ordinance's vagueness. Id. at 385-86.
60 See notes 8-11 supra and accompanying text.
61 455 U.S. at 495.
62 Se note 1 supra.
63 455 U.S. at 494. The Court pointed out that when determining whether a law reached
a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct, a court should evaluate both the
ambiguous and unambiguous scope of the enactment. The Court deemed this necessary be-
cause ambiguous meanings tend to cause citizens to "steer far wider of the unlawful zone...
than if the boundaries of the forbidden area were clearly marked." Id. at 494 n.6 (citations
omitted). Thus, the Court recognized that the vagueness of a law will affect a court's over-
breadth analysis. Id.
Justice White thought it unnecessary for the Court to engage in any discussion of over-
breadth because the Seventh Circuit had based its decision solely on vagueness grounds. Id.
at 507 (White, J., concurring). He felt it was sufficient to reverse simply because the circuit
court had erred in its analysis of the vagueness problem presented by the village's ordinance.
Id. Nevertheless, Justice White went on to discuss overbreadth, and stated that Flipside's
argument was "tenuous at best." Id. at 508. See notes 8-11 supra and accompanying text.
64 Id. at 495.
65 Flipside argued that the ordinance was a prior restraint on speech because the guide-
lines to the ordinance treated the proximity of drug related literature as an indication that
paraphernalia was "marketed for use with illegal cannabis or drugs." Id. at 495-96.
66 Flipside argued that the ordinance infringed on protected symbolic speech because the
presence of drug related designs, logos, or slogans on paraphernalia could lead to enforcement
of the ordinance. Id. at 496.
67 Id at 496. The Court determined that the ordinance did not infringe on the noncom-
mercial speech of Flipside or other parties because it merely regulated the sale of items dis-
played "with" or "within proximity of" literature encouraging illegal use of cannabis or
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the ordinance might have on the first amendment rights of individu-
als other than Flipside was irrelevant, because the overbreadth doc-
trine did not apply to commercial speech.
68
2. Vagueness and Fair Warning 69
The Court then proceeded to the second phase of its analysis
and addressed Flipside's vagueness challenge. The crucial question
was whether, assuming the enactment implicates no constitutionally
protected conduct, was it impermissibly vague in all of its applica-
tions? 70 Using Grayned7l as its framework, the Court analyzed
(1) whether certain language in the ordinance failed to provide fair
warning, and (2) whether the risk of arbitrary or discriminatory en-
forcement existed. The village's ordinance required Flipside to ob-
tain a license to sell "any items, effect, paraphernalia, accessory or
thing which is designed or marketed for use with illegal cannabis or
drugs, as defined by the Illinois Revised Statutes. ' 72 Flipside at-
illegal drugs. Id. As such, the ordinance did not regulate in any manner the sale of the
literature itself. Id. Concerning the allegation that the ordinance infringed on protected sym-
bolic speech, the Court stated that although certain items with logos or designs may be sub-
ject to regulation, the ordinance did not restrict speech, but rather regulated the commercial
marketing of items whose labels reveal that they may be used for illicit purposes. Id.
It is well established that a government can regulate or ban any commercial speech that
proposes an illegal transaction. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
447 U.S. 557, 563-64 (1980); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S.
376, 388 (1973).
68 Id. at 496-97. (citing 447 U.S. at 565 n.8.). Flipside also contended that the village
ordinance was "overbroad" because it could be extended to "innocent" and "lawful" uses of
items as well as uses with illegal drugs. Some courts have incorrectly ruled paraphernalia
laws unconstitutional for that reason. See, e.g., Bambu Sales, Inc. v. Gibson, 474 F.Supp. 1297
(D.N.J. 1979). But as the Supreme Court stated in Flipside "this argument seems to confuse
vagueness and overbreadth." 455 U.S. at 497 n.9. The Court noted that if the Flipside was
actually objecting because it could not determine whether the ordinance regulates items with
some lawful uses then it was complaining of vagueness. Id. If Flipside was objecting because
the ordinance would inhibit innocent uses of items covered by the ordinance, then it was
complaining of denial of substantive due process. Id. The Court found Flipside's possible
substantive due process challenge lacking in merit, noting that a retailer's right to sell and a
purchaser's right to buy smoking accessories were entitled to only minimum due process pro-
tection. As such, the village would have little trouble showing that regulating the items was a
rational means of discouraging drug use. Id. (citing Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland,
437 U.S. 117, 124-25 (1978)). See note 31 supra.
69 See notes 5-7 supra and accompanying text.
70 455 U.S. at 497.
71 Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972). See notes 5-7 supra and accompany-
ing text.
72 455 U.S. at 500. Prior to engaging in its analysis, the Supreme Court made some
important observations. First, the Constitution tolerates vagueness in varying degrees de-
pending in part on the nature of the enactment. Id. at 498. Thus, a criminal ordinance
warrants a stricter test than one imposing civil penalties. Id. at 498-99. Second, the Court
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tacked both the "designed for use" standard and the "marketed for
use" standard as unconstitutionally vague. The Supreme Court re-
jected both contentions.
The Court held that the "designed for use" standard was *suffi-
ciently clear to cover at least some items Flipside sold, and therefore
was not void for vagueness. 73 The Court noted that the business per-
son of ordinary intelligence would know that the term "designed for
use" referred to the design of the manufacturer, not the intent of the
retailer or customer.74 Because the Court found that items princi-
pally used for non-drug uses were clearly not "designed for use" with
illegal drugs, and because Flipside had conceded the phrase referred
to the structural characteristics of an item, the Supreme Court held
that the fair warning requirement of Grained was satisfied. 75 The
expressly recognized that a scienter requirement can mitigate a law's vagueness, especially
with respect to the fair warning requirement of the Grayned test. Id. at 499. See note 43 supra.
Finally, the Court stated that the most important factor affecting whether the Constitution
will tolerate an allegedly vague law is whether the law tended to inhibit constitutionally
protected rights. Id. The Court then went on to subject Hoffman Estates's "quasi-criminal"
ordinance to a strict test. The Court recognized the "stigmatizing" effects the ordinance
would have. Id. Even if a shop did obtain the. license, who would buy the items with the
condition that they give their name and address, and that their name and address would be
put in a record available to police inspection? That the Court subjected the Hoffman Estates
ordinance to a strict test is important. The ordinance imposed only civil penalties. Had the
Court chosen to subject it to a less rigorous analysis, the decision in Fibpside would have rela-
tively slight precedential value in subsequent cases where MDPA-type laws, with their crimi-
nal sanctions, were being attacked as unconstitutionally vague. In the one circuit court case
striking down a drug paraphernalia law subsequent to Flipside, the Seventh Circuit relied
heavily upon the fact that the ordinance at issue, unlike the ordinance involved in Fliside,
imposed criminal penalties. Record Head Corp. v. Sachen, 682 F.2d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 1982).
As the dissenting judge noted, this distinction might well have been unjustified. Id. at 682.
(Pell, J. dissenting).
73 455 U.S. at 502. Flipside had argued that the "designed for use" standard was ambig-
uous in several respects. Flipside claimed that it did not say (1) whether the retailer's intent
or manner of display is relevant, (2) whether the intent of a third party (the manufacturer)
was critical since the third party was the "designer," or (3) whether items must be inherently
suited only for a single purpose-drug use. Id. at 500.
74 Id. at 501. An interesting question is whether the Court was using the term design as a
synonym for intent. The definition the Court gave to design, "to fashion according to a
plan," Id., seems to suggest that the answer could be yes. See note 75 infra.
75 455 U.S. at 501. The Court did not expressly state that the "designed for use" stan-
dard incorporated a scienter requirement that tended to mitigate any possible vagueness. See
note 43 supra. But a close reading of the Flipsid opinion suggests that this was a factor in the
Court's decision. The Court quoted the Flipside's brief in support of its conclusion that there
was no issue of fair warning present as Flipside conceded that the phrase "designed for use"
referred to structural characteristics of an item. Id. In that quote, the following language
appeared: "if any intentional conduct is implicated by the phrase, it is the intent of the
designer (i.e. patent holder or manufacturer) whose intent for an item or 'design' is absorbed
into the physical attributes, or structural 'design' of the finished product." Id. at 501 n.19
(quoting Brief for Appellee at 42-43). Therefore, the Court may well have read the "designed
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Court read the "marketed for use" language as incorporating a scien-
ter requirement, for a "retailer could scarcely 'market' items for a
particular use without intending that use."' 76 The Court held that
the scienter requirement rendered the "marketed for use" standard
"transparently clear," 77 and that since some of Flipside's display
techniques obviously violated ordinance guidelines, Flipside had fair
warning that its marketing activities required a license.
78
3. Vagueness and Discriminatory Enforcement
79
Turning to the second prong of the Grajyned test, the Court asked
whether the Village's ordinance presented the danger of discrimina-
tory enforcement. Although the Court acknowledged that the threat
of such enforcement existed, 80 it stated it was improper to adjudicate
the issue in a pre-enforcement facial challenge."' The Court stated
that this challenge could not be made until the possibility of discrim-
inatory enforcement "ripens into a prosecution. '8 2 The Flipside opin-
ion is carefully tailored to apply only to pre-enforcement facial
challenges to drug paraphernalia laws. But the decision's impact is
deceptively broad because these challenges inevitably arise in the
pre-enforcement context.83 No headshop owner of sound mind is
willing to undergo voluntary prosecution under a criminal statute in
order that he may litigate the merits of his vagueness--discrimina-
tory enforcement claim.
for use" language as incorporating a scienter requirement, one referring to the intent of the
manufacturer or designer of the item; an intent evidenced by the structural characteristics of
the item itself. This is important because the "designed for use" language is contained in the
MDPA, and has been subjected to attack on the grounds that it is unconstitutionally vague.
See notes 90 & 94-95 injfa and accompanying text.
76 455 U.S. at 502.
77 Id. See notes 43 & 72 supra (scienter requirement can cure an otherwise vague statute).
78 455 U.S. at 502.
79 See notes 5-7 supra and accompanying text.
80 The Court stated: "We do not suggest that the risk of discriminatory enforcement is
insignificant here." 455 U.S. at 503.
81 Id.
82 455 U. S. at 503-04 n.21. The Supreme Court also gave weight to the possibility that
the village could take further steps to minimize the danger of arbitrary enforcement. Id. at
504.
83 The Flipside decision effectively precludes a headshop owner from challenging any
drug paraphernalia law for vagueness (because of discriminatory enforcement) in a pre-en-
forcement setting. It is quite possible, therefore, that a drug paraphernalia law will accom-
plish its purpose--shut down headshops---without ever being subjected to attack on grounds
of vagueness for arbitrary enforcement. The Supreme Court in Flipsid intimated that such
an attack might be successful. See note 80 supra.
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V. The Smoke Clears
The Supreme Court has never passed on the constitutionality of
the Model Drug Paraphernalia Act.8 4 Nevertheless, the Flipside deci-
sion has eliminated three of the five problem areas8 5 that once
plagued the MDPA.6 Moreover, Flipside, read in conjunction with
several subsequent circuit court cases, indicates that the MDPA is
either constitutional in its entirety or constitutional after severing
some objectionable language.
Headshop owners attacking the MDPA language "intended for
use or designed for use" invariably claim that "intended for use" is
unconstitutionally vague because it fails to give fair notice to one
whose conduct may be subject to the law's prohibitions-.8 7 This at-
tack is directed at the heart of the MDPA, the scienter requirement,
which is meant to mitigate any vagueness problems.88 The claim is
that the scienter requirement is ineffective in curing vagueness be-
cause the statute does not say whose intent is relevant. Thus, the
plaintiffs contend that the "intended for use" language permits the
prosecution of one person on the basis of the unknown intent of an-
other.89 This "transferred intent" argument was rejected in Flipside9O
and has been explicitly rejected by the courts of appeals, that have
ruled on the issue subsequent to Fliside.91 A fair reading of the stat-
84 But the Court did deny certiorari in two cases where the Act was upheld in its entirety.
See note 52 supra.
85 See text accompanying notes 45-49 supra.
86 See notes 47-48 supra.
87 See notes 5-7 supra and accompanying text.
88 See note 43 supra and accompanying text.
89 See, e.g., New England Accessories Trade Ass'n v. City of Nashua, 679 F.2d 1, 5 (1st
Cir. 1982).
90 455 U.S. at 501. The Court stated that "a business person of ordinary intelligence
would understand that this term refers to the design of the manufacturer, not the intent of the
retailer or customer." See notes 73-75 supra and accompanying text. See also notes 94-95 infia
and accompanying text.
91 Stoianoff v. State of Montana 695 F.2d 1214, 1220 (9th Cir. 1983); New England
Accessories Trade Ass'n v. City of Nashua, 679 F.2d 1, 5-6 (1st Cir. 1982); New England
Accessories Trade Ass'n v. Tierney, 691 F.2d 35, 35-36 (lst Cir. 1982); Florida Businessmen v.
City of Hollywood, 673 F.2d 1213, 1219 (11 th Cir. 1982); Tobacco Accessories v. Treen, 681
F.2d 378, 383 (5th Cir. 1982); Kansas Retail Trade Co-Op v. Stephan, 695 F.2d 1343, 1346
(10th Cir. 1982); General Stores, Inc. v. Bingaman, 695 F.2d 502, 503-04 (10th Cir. 1982);
Weiler v. Carpenter, 695 F.2d 1348, 1349-50 (10th Cir. 1982); Levas & Levas v. Village of
Antioch, Ill., 684 F.2d 446,452 (7th Cir. 1982). Accord Hejira Corp. v. MacFarlane, 660 F.2d
1356 (10th Cir. 1981) (a pre-Fliside decision involving Colorado's non-MDPA statute); Cas-
bah, Inc. v. Thone, 651 F.2d 551 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1005 (1982), reh q denied,
102 S.Ct. 2023 (1982) (a pre-Flipsid decision involving Nebraska's MDPA-based act). Contra
Record Head Corp. v. Sachen, 682 F.2d 672, 673 (7th Cir. 1982). Record Head involved a non-
MDPA ordinance; the court struck down the "intended for use" language as vague. A strong
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ute as a whole, including the portions defining the substantive of-
fenses which focus on the mental state of the accused, indicates that
the intent referred to by the language "intended for use" is that of
the person alleged to have violated the statute.92 Therefore, the lan-
guage presents no vagueness for lack of fair warning problem. 93
Plaintiffs attacking the "designed for use" language likewise as-
sert the "transferred intent" argument.9 4 F hizside, as well as the re-
cent circuit court cases, have rejected the argument. They hold that
since the language clearly refers to structural features of objects
deemed fashioned for drug use, the intent implicated is that of the
designer or manufacturer of the drug paraphernalia; thus the lan-
guage is not unconstitutionally vague.95
The circuit courts have found no vagueness problem with article
I's list of items that are to be included as drug paraphernalia.9 6 The
courts have uniformly held that because the statute defines "drug
paraphernalia" in terms of specific intent, no item will be considered
drug paraphernalia unless the requisite intent to use it with con-
trolled substances exists.9 7 The presence of the specific intent re-
dissent failed to comprehend the majority's distinction between the "intended for use" lan-
guage at issue and the "marketed for use" language that the Fipside court had held to be
constitutional. Id at 683. (Pell, J., dissenting).
92 New England Accessories Trade Ass'n v. City of Nashua, 679 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1982).
In Stoianoffv. State of Montana, 695 F.2d 1214 (9th Cir. 1983), the court recognized that the
MDPA's definition of drug paraphernalia was an inartful but legitimate attempt to assign the
appropriate scienter requirement to the appropriate offender. "Use" is assigned to the user.
"Designed for use" is assigned to the manufacturer. "Intended for use" is assigned to the
retailer or distributor. Id at 1220.
93 Set notes 5-7 supra and accompanying text.
94 See, e.g., Florida Businessmen v. City of Hollywood, 673 F.2d 1213, 1218 (1 1th Cir.
1982).
95 455 U.S. at 500-02. See notes 73-75 supra and accompanying text. See, e.g., Stoianoff v.
State of Montana; 695 F.2d 1214, 1219-20 (9th Cir. 1983); Florida Businessmen v. City of
Hollywood, 673 F.2d 1213, 1218-19 (11th Cir. 1982) (the court noted that the designer's in-
tent is reflected by the physical characteristics of the finished product); Tobacco Accessories v.
Treen, 681 F.2d 378, 384-85 (5th Cir. 1982); Contra Record Head Corp. v. Sachen, 682 F.2d
672, 677 (7th Cir. 1982) (non-MDPA-based ordinance).
96 Kansas Retail Trade Co-Op. v. Stephan, 695 F.2d 1343, 1347 (10th Cir. 1982); New
England Accessories Trade Ass'n v. Tierney, 691 F.2d 35, 38 (lst Cir. 1982). Accord Casbah,
Inc. v. Thone, 651 F.2d 551, 560 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1005 (1982), reh g denied,
102 S. Ct. 2023 (1982); Record Revolution No. 6, Inc. v. City of Parma, 638 F.2d 916, 932
(6th Cir. 1980),vacatedandremanded, 451 U.S. 1013 (1981), vacated and remanded, 102 S. Ct. 2227
(1982).
97 Id In Levas & Levas v. Village of Antioch, Ill., 684 F.2d 446, 455-56 (7th Cir. 1982),
the court noted that a legislature might constiutionally make certain items of drug parapher-
nalia (coke spoons and marijuana or hash pipes) per se illegal without any intent require-




quirement precludes a plaintiff from prevailing on a contention that
this list is unconstitutionally vague.98
Plaintiffs attacking the factors listed in article I that a court or
other authority should consider when determining whether an object
is drug paraphernalia argue that the list is vague because it fails to
establish explicit enforcement standards. 99 Flips'de unequivocally
held that although a law may present the danger of arbitrary en-
forcement, that theoretical possibility does not render the law vague
in a pre-enforcement challenge. 100 Therefore, Flipside effectively pro-
hibits a headshop owner from raising a challenge to this list of factors
in a pre-enforcement suit. The argument can be made only when the
possibility actually ripens into a prosecution. 101
Flipside did not address the constructive knowledge standard
used in articles I and II. The circuit courts that have addressed the
issue have held, with few exceptions, 0 2 that this language does not
void a paraphernalia law for vagueness. 0 3 Plaintiffs attacking the
MDPA's constructive knowledge standard contend that the language
permits conviction under the law on a mere negligence standard.
0 4
98 See notes 43 & 72 supra. See also notes 5-7 supra and accompanying text.
99 See, e.g., Tobacco Accessories v. Treen, 681 F.2d 378, 384 (5th Cir. 1982); New Eng-
land Accessories Trade Ass'n v. City of Nashua, 679 F.2d 1, 6-7 (Ist Cir. 1982); Florida Busi-
nessmen v. City of Hollywood, 673 F.2d 1213, 1219-20 (11th Cir. 1982); Levas & Levas v.
Village of Antioch, Ill., 684 F.2d 446, 454 (7th Cir. 1982).
100 455 U.S. at 503-04. See notes 79-83 supra and accompanying text.
101 455 U.S. at 503-04. Contra Record Head Corp. v. Sachen, 682 F.2d 672, 677-78 (7th
Cir. 1982). The court in Record Head characterized the non-MDPA ordinance at issue as
criminal. As such, the court felt the ordinance presented a more serious possibility of arbi-
trary enforcement than did the "business regulation" involved in the Flipside case. Therefore,
the Seventh Circuit found the ordinance constitutionally infirm for satisfying neither the fair
notice nor the consistent enforcement branches of the Grayned test. 682 F.2d at 678. In light
of Flipside, the holding in Record Head concerning the possibility of arbitrary enforcement
would appear to be improper. See notes 79-83 supra and accompanying text. This is espe-
cially apparent because the Supreme Court in Fipside treated the Hoffman Estates' ordi-
nance as "quasi-criminal" and subjected it to a strict test. See note 72 supra.
102 Record Revolution No. 6, Inc. v. City of Parma, 638 F.2d 916, 935-36 (6th Cir. 1980),
vacated and remanded, 451 U.S. 1013 (1981),vacatedand remanded, 102 S. Ct. 2227 (1982) (holding
the "reasonably should know" language unconstiutionally vague).
103 Stoianoff v. State of Montana 695 F.2d 1213, 1220-22 (9th Cir. 1982); Florida Busi-
nessmen v. City of Hollywood, 673 F.2d 1213, 1219 (11th Cir. 1982) (noting that the fact a
defendant reasonably should have known something is established in substantially the same
manner as actual knowledge); New England Accessories Trade Ass'n v. Tierney, 691 F.2d 35,
36-37 (1st Cir. 1982); Kansas Retail Trade Co-op v. Stephan, 695 F.2d 1343, 1346 (10th Cir.
1982); Casbah, Inc. v. Thone, 651 F.2d 551, 561 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1005
(1982), reh g denied, 102 S. Ct. 2023 (1982). See Delaware Accessories Trade Ass'n v. Gebelien,
497 F. Supp. 289, 294 (D. Del. 1980).
104 See., e.g., New England Accessories Trade Ass'n v. Tierney, 691 F.2d 35, 36-37 (1st Cir.
1982).
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However, the courts have found that argument unpersuasive because
the MDPA's definitional section classifies an item as drug parapher-
nalia only if it is used, intended to be used or is designed for use with
illicit, controlled substances.1 05 Thus, to prove a violation of an
MDPA-based paraphernalia law, the government must show (1) that
the defendant intended that an item would be used for the produc-
tion or consumption of controlled substances and (2) that the defend-
ant knew, or that he acted under circumstances from which the
reasonable person would know, that the buyer of the item would
thereafter use the item with illicit controlled substances.10 6 There-
fore, the constructive knowledge standard has significance only if the
defendant is selling or delivering items that he intends from the out-
set to be used to produce or consume controlled substances. 0 7 Plain-
tiffs have also argued that the constructive knowledge standard is
unconstitutionally vague because it provides no guidance to defend-
ants, prosecutors, or judges. 0 8 FIl'side undermines this contention
by its holding that objections to the possibility of discriminatory en-
forcement can only be raised in post-enforcement proceedings. 10 9
Because the "speech" involved in advertising drug parapherna-
lia is commercial speech, Fh'bside disposes of any first amendment
attack on the MDPA's provision prohibiting the advertisement of
drug paraphernalia. 10 Also, any "speech" implicated by MDPA ar-
ticle II constitutes speech proposing an illegal transaction; thus a gov-
ernment can regulate or ban the speech altogether."' Regarding
any overbreadth problems, Flipside unequivocally held that the over-
breadth doctrine does not apply to commercial speech.' 1 2 The lan-
guage "in part" contained in the MDPA's advertising prohibition,
105 MDPA Art. L
106 New England Accessories Trade Ass'n v. Tierney, 691 F.2d 35, 37 (Ist Cir. 1982)
(quoting Delaware Accessories Trade Ass'n, v. Gebelien, 497 F. Supp. 289, 294 (D. Del.
1980)). See also note 103 supra. In Gebelien, the court noted that a seller is safe so long as he
does not actually know the buyer's purpose and as long as the objective facts that are there for
him to observe do not give fair notice that illegal use will ensue. 497 F. Supp. at 294.
107 Id In Florida Businessmen v. City of Hollywood, 673 F.2d 1213, 1219 (1 1th Cir. 1982)
the court noted that the "reasonably should know" standard did not punish innocent or in-
adverant conduct. Rather it establishes a scienter requirement that the defendant acted in
bad faith, with intent or knowledge that the recipient will use the paraphernalia with con-
trolled substances.
108 See, e.g., New England Accessories Trade Ass'n. v. Tierney, 691 F.2d 35, 37 (1st Cir.
1982).
109 See notes 79-83 supra and accompanying text. See also notes 99-101 supra and accompa-
nying text.
110 455 U.S. at 496. See notes 60-68 supra and accompanying text.
111 455 U.S. at 496.
112 Id at 497.
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however, may be unconstitutionally overbroad. This language could
arguably refer to some speech which, unlike that advocating the sale
of drug paraphernalia, is completely lawful and thus protected.'
13
Careful lawmakers should determine whether prudence dictates ex-
cising the "in part" language from a particular anti-drug parapher-
nalia law.
VI. Conclusion--Swan Song for the Bong?
A government may regulate or ban drug paraphernalia entirely.
Banning drug paraphernalia bears a rational relationship to the fur-
therance of a legitimate government goal - curbing the prolifera-
tion of illicit drug use. But the law, the vehicle through which the
government seeks to reach that goal, must be drawn with sufficient
clarity so as not to offend the due process requirements of the Consti-
tution. The history of drug paraphernalia laws is one in which
lawmakers have sought to strike the careful balance between effec-
tiveness and constitutional validity. Effective laws were often struck
down as unconstitutionally vague, while laws that may have passed
constitutional muster would by their very nature have been unable
to deal with the complex and pervasive problem of drug abuse.
The Model Drug Paraphernalia Act was drafted to strike the
balance. The Act's breadth of coverage--extending to users, manu-
facturers, and sellers of drug paraphernalia-combined with its crim-
inal penalties effectively bans drug paraphernalia. Moreover, the
Act's precise definitions and its scienter requirement mitigate consti-
tutional vagueness problems. Flipside and the recent circuit court de-
cisions make it clear that the Act is constitutional.
Now a government has the power and the means to ban drug
paraphernalia. The only question that remains is whether it should.
This is a question that lawmakers are competent to decide. They,
and not the courts, should now determine whether it is time to play
the swan song for the bong.
Michael D. Guinan
113 See New England Accessories Trade Ass'n v. City of Nashua, 679 F.2d 1, 4 (lst Cir.
1982). (citing Record Revolution No. 6 Inc. v. City of Parma, 638 F.2d 916, 937 (6th Cir.
1980)). In Record Revolution the Sixth Circuit expressed the concern that the use of the words
"in part" could result in the supression of speech urging the reform of drug laws. The pur-
pose of the overbreadth doctrine is to prevent speech of that type from being muted or "chil-
led." See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973).
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APPENDIX A
Village of Hoffman Estates Ordinance No. 969-1978
AN ORDINANCE AMENDING THE MUNICIPAL CODE OF
THE VILLAGE OF HOFFMAN ESTATES BY PROVIDING
FOR REGULATION OF ITEMS DESIGNED OR MAR-
KETED FOR USE WITH ILLEGAL CANNABIS OR DRUGS
WHEREAS, certain items designed or marketed for use with illegal
drugs are being retailed within the Village of Hoffman Estates, Cook
County, Illinois, and
WHEREAS, it is recognized that such items are legal retail items
and that their sale cannot be banned, and
WHEREAS, there is evidence that these items are designed or mar-
keted for use with illegal cannabis or drugs and it is in the best inter-
ests of the health, safety and welfare of the citizens of the Village of
Hoffman Estates to regulate within the Village the sale of items
designed or marketed for use with illegal cannabis or drugs.
NOW THEREFORE, BE IT ORDAINED by the President and
Board of Trustees of the Village of Hoffman Estates, Cook County,
Illinois as follows:
Section 1: That the Hoffman Estates Municipal Code be amended by
adding thereto an additional section, Section 8-7-16, which addi-
tional section shall read as follows:
Sec. 8-7-16-ITEMS DESIGNED OR MARKETED FOR USE
WITH ILLEGAL CANNABIS OR DRUGS
A. License Required:
It shall be unlawful for any person or persons as principal, clerk,
agent or servant to sell any items, effect, paraphernalia, accessory or
thing which is designed or marketed for use with illegal cannabis or
drugs, as defined by Illinois Revised Statutes, without obtaining a
license therefor. Such license shall be in addition to any or all other
licenses held by applicant.
B. Application:
Application to sell any item, effect, paraphernalia, accessory or
thing which is designed or marketed for use with illegal cannabis or
drugs shall, in addition to requirements of Article 8-1, be accompa-
nied by affidavits by applicant and each and every employee au-
thorized to sell such items that such person has never been
convicted of a drug-related offense.
C. Minors:
It shall be unlawful to sell or give items as described in Section 8-7-
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16A in any form to any male or female child under eighteen years
of age.
D. Records:
Every licensee must keep a record of every item, effect, parapherna-
lia, accessory or thing which is designed or marketed for use with
illegal cannabis or drugs which is sold and this record shall be open
to the inspection of any police officer at any time during the hours
of business. Such record shall contain the name and address of the
purchaser, the name and quantity of the product, the date and time
of the sale, and the licensee or agent of the licensee's signature, such
records shall be retained for not less than two (2) years.
E. Regulations:
The applicant shall comply with all applicable regulations of the
Department of Health Services and the Police Department.
Section 2: That the Hoffman Estates Municipal Code be amended by
adding to Sec. 8-2-1 Fees: Merchants (Products) the additional lan-
guage as follows:
Items designed or marketed for use with illegal cannabis or drugs
$150.00
Section 3: Penalty. Any person violating any provision of this ordi-
nance shall be fined not less than ten dollars ($10.00) nor more than
five hundred dollars ($500.00) for the first offense and succeeding of-
fenses during the same calendar year, and each day that such viola-
tion shall continue shall be deemed a separate and distinct offense.
Section 4: That the Village Clerk be and is hereby authorized to pub-
lish this ordinance in pamphlet form.
Section 5: That this ordinance shall be in full force and effect May 1,
1978, after its passage, approval and publication according to law.
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APPENDIX B
MODEL DRUG PARAPHERNALIA ACT
ARTICLE I
(Definitions)
SECTION (insert designation of definitional section) of the Con-
trolled Substances Act of this State is amended by adding the follow-
ing after paragraph (insert designation of last definition in section):
"() The term 'Drug Paraphernalia' means all equipment, products
and materials of any kind which are used, intended for use, or
designed for use, in planting, propagating, cultivating, growing, har-
vesting, manufacturing, compounding, converting, producing,
processing, preparing, testing, analyzing, packaging, repackaging,
storing, containing, concealing, injecting, ingesting, inhaling, or
otherwise introducing into the human body a controlled substance in
violation of this Act (meaning the Controlled Substances Act of this
State). It includes, but is not limited to:
(1) Kits used, intended for use, or designed for use in planting,
propagating, cultivating, growing or harvesting of any species or
plant which is a controlled substance or from which a controlled sub-
stance can be derived;
(2) Kits used, intended for use, or designed for use in manufactur-
ing, compounding, converting, producing, processing, or preparing
controlled substances:
(3) Isomerization devices used, intended for use, or designed for
use in increasing the potency of any species of plant which is a con-
trolled substance;
(4) Testing equipment used, intended for use, or designed for use
in identifying, or in analyzing the strength, effectiveness or purity of
controlled substances;
(5) Scales and balances used, intended for use, or designed for us-
ing in weighing or measuring controlled substances;
(6) Diluents and adulterants, such as quinine hydrochloride, man-
nitol, mannite, dextrose and lactose, used, intended for use, or
designed for use in cutting controlled substances;
(7) Separation gins and sifters used, intended for use, or designed
for use in removing twigs and seeds from, or in otherwise cleaning or
refining, marihuana;
(8) Blenders, bowls, containers, spoons and mixing devices used,
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intended for use, or designed for use in compounding controlled
substances;
(9) Capsules, balloons, envelopes and other containers used, in-
tended for use, or designed for use in packaging small quantities of
controlled substances;
(10) Containers and other objects used, intended for use, or
designed for use in storing or concealing controlled substances;
(11) Hypodermic syringes, needles and other objects used, intended
for use, or designed for use in parenterally injecting controlled sub-
stances into the human body;
(12) Objects used, intended for use, or designed for use in ingesting,
inhaling, or otherwise introducing marihuana, cocaine, hashish, or
hashish oil into the human body, such as:
(a) Metal, wooden, acrylic, glass, stone, plastic, or ceramic
pipes with or without screens, permanent screens, hashish heads, or
punctured metal bowls;
(b) Water pipes;
(c) Carburetion tubes and devices;
(d) Smoking and carburetion masks;
(e) Roach clips: meaning objects to hold burning material,
such as a marihuana cigarette, that has become too small or too short
to be held in the hand;







(m) Ice pipes or chillers;
In determining whether an object is Drug paraphernalia, a court or
other authority should consider, in addition to all other logically rele-
vant factors, the following:
(1) Statements by an owner or by anyone in control of the
object concerning its use;
(2) Prior convictions, if any, of an owner, or of anyone in con-
trol of the object, under any State or Federal law relating to any
controlled substance;
(3) The proximity of the object, in time and space, to a direct
violation of this Act;
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(4) The proximity of the object to controlled substances;
(5) The existence of any residue of controlled substance on
the object;
(6) Direct or circumstantial evidence of the intent of an own-
er, or of anyone in control of the object, to deliver it to persons whom
he knows, or should reasonably know, intend to use the object to
facilitate a violation of this Act; the innocence of an owner, or of
anyone in control of the object, as to a direct violation of this Act
shall not prevent a finding that the object is intended for use, or
designed for use as Drug paraphernalia;
(7) Instructions, oral or written, provided with the object con-
cerning its use;
(8) . Descriptive materials accompanying the object which ex-
plain or depict its use;
(9) National and local advertising concerning its use;
(10) The manner in which the object is displayed for sale;
(11) Whether the owner, or anyone in control of the object, is a
legitimate supplier of like or related items to the community, such as
a licensed distributor or dealer of tobacco products;
(12) Direct or circumstantial evidence of the ratio of sales of
the object(s) to the total sales of the business enterprise;
(13) The existence and scope of legitimate uses for the object
in the community;
(14) Expert testimony concerning its use."
ARTICLE II
(Offenses and Penalties)
SECTION (designation of offenses and penalties section) of the Con-
trolled Substances Act of this State is amended by adding the follow-
ing after (designation of last substantive offense):
"SECTION (A) (Possession of Drug Paraphernalia)
It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with intent to
use, drug paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest,
manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, an-
alyze, pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, or
otherwise introduce into the human body a controlled substance in
violation of this Act. Any person who violates this section is guilty of
a crime and upon conviction may be imprisoned for not more than
(), fined not more than ( ), or both."
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"SECTION (B) (Manufacture or Delivery of Drug Paraphernalia)
It is unlawful for any person to deliver, possess with intent to
deliver, or manufacture with intent to deliver, drug paraphernalia,
knowing, or under circumstances where one reasonably should know,
that it will be used to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest,
manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, an-
alyze, pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, or
otherwise introduce into the human body a controlled substance in
violation of this Act. Any person who violates this section is guilty of
a crime and upon conviction may be imprisoned for not more than (
), fined not more than ( ), or both."
"SECTION (C) (Delivery of Drug Paraphernalia to a Minor)
Any person 18 years of age or over who violates Section (B) by
delivering drug paraphernalia to a person under 18 years of age who
is at least 3 years his junior is guilty of a special offense and upon
conviction may be imprisoned for not more than (), fined not more
than ( ), or both."
"SECTION (D) (Advertisement of Drug Paraphernalia)
It is unlawful for any person to place in any newspaper, maga-
zine, handbill, or other publication any advertisement, knowing, or
under circumstances where one reasonably should know, that the
purpose of the advertisement, in whole or in part, is to promote the
sale of objects designed or intended for use as drug paraphernalia.
Any person who violates this section is guilty of a crime and upon
conviction may be imprisoned for not more than (), fined not more
than (), or both."
ARTICLE III
(Civil Forfeiture)
SECTION (insert designation of civil forfeiture section) of the Con-
trolled Substances Act of this States is amended to provide for the
civil seizure and forefeiture of drug paraphernalia by adding the fol-
lowing after paragraph (insert designation of last category of forfeita-
ble property):
"( ) all drug paraphernalia as defined by Section ( ) of this
Act.'
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ARTICLE IV
(Severability)
If any provision of this Act or the application thereof to any person
or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other
provisions or applications of the Act which can be given effect with-
out the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provi-
sions of this Act are severable.
